The following text represents the written remarks delivered by Dr. Christopher Wales during the recent symposium held on Sept 30, 2025 at the University of Seville.

‘Citizens or serfs? Are we all serfs in our own tax systems?’

Opening remarks

The speaker noted that main theme of the two-day conference concerned citizens’ relationships with the tax systems. He expressed gratitude to the Dean, to Professor Bocardo and Asociación Gracchus, for hosting the conference, and acknowledged Robert Amsterdam for his key role in transforming the discourse about human rights and the Spanish tax agency (Agencia Estatal de Administración Tributaria, or AEAT). His work has drawn public attention to abuses and rights violations within the tax authority which Hacienda might have preferred to keep unseen and has served as an inspiration to many.[1]

Many of the issues which Mr Amsterdam has brought to greater prominence have been recognized by Spanish academics, lawyers and economists in their own work, examining the problems that emanate from Hacienda and its daughter, the AEAT.[2] Yet, as he stressed, Mr Amsterdam’s work has brought a new level of international visibility and advocacy energy. He “brought his own particular torch to this bonfire”, as the speaker put it, becoming an inspirational leader as both lawyer and advocate.

An international comparative analysis of taxpayer rights

This lecture sought to start the conference proceedings with facts and comparative analysis – to set out the background and evidence before opening the issues for discussion in later sessions.

The speaker explained that he intended to provide a comparative analysis of Spain’s tax system from the perspective of taxpayer rights in law and practice, identifying and examining the factors that shape the relationship between taxing authorities and those who are subject to taxation.The analysis drew upon specific comparative research on taxpayer rights across 21 countries, including Spain, conducted jointly by Dr Hannelore Niesten and an international team of researchers.

Summary of findings

The comparative analysis yields three main findings regarding Spain.

1. Formal compliance and apparent normality
   On several measures of taxpayer rights, it is perfectly possible to conclude that, among the group of 21 countries examined, Spain looks relatively “normal”. Normal, thatis, provided one does not look too deeply. If the questions are posed in such a way that they can be answered with a simple “yes” or “no”, Spain appears to be part of the pack. “Does Spain have a tax Ombudsman?” Yes. “Does the tax agency have an Ethical Code?” Yes. Being able to answer “Yes” to questions like these, is of enormous importance to the Spanish government. It allows the tax agency to present an image of compliance and regularity in international fora such as the OECD and to maintain the fiction that the tax environment in Spain is “normal”. In the past, foreign administrations such as the His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) in the United Kingdom, and the US Treasury, have been hoodwinked by this presentation of regularity – at least until they were presented by Mr Amsterdam with evidence that demonstrated otherwise.
2. Substantive divergence from international norms

When the surface is probed more deeply, it becomes clear that Spain is, even on the most favourable and generous interpretation, right at the edge of the group of 21, where very few countries are to be found. “Yes, there is a tax Ombudsman, but it is a captive institution of Hacienda”.[3] “Yes, the tax agency has an Ethical Code, but it is more concerned with mandating the loyalty of its staff than with taxpayer rights”. Spain is consistently at the far edge of “regularity”. Other countries may be at the same, wrong edge on some measures, but none are there with the consistency of Spain.

• Spain’s status as a distinct outlier

There are two issues on which Spain is indisputably an outlier: firstly, the framing, in law and practice, of the relationship between the tax agency and the taxpayer, which is at the heart of the Granada Declaration and the theme of this conference; and secondly, the system of financial incentives – the bonus system for tax agency staff – which has now been in place for a decade.[4] Based on the available evidence, these are the drivers of the undesirable and inappropriate practices observed throughout Spain and at the core of the problem of the administration of the tax system.

These points can be illustrated further, but before doing, it is useful to make some general remarks about the relationships between citizens and tax systems and the need for them to be rooted in democratic frameworks.

Taxation and the democratic framework

The people should own the tax system as much as the government

Firstly, the tax systemdoes not exist in a vacuum. It cannot be designed, managed and administered as if it was a black box, free-standing and independent, responding only to its own internal rules. It has to be understood as part of the social and economic framework in which we live. It has real effects on people from every walk of life and on the businesses that people run. For this reason, the tax system should be owned – in both design and implementation – as much by the people as by the government. Those entrusted with its development and management should be fully accountable to those from whom, and for whose benefit, they collect the taxes. Without public support and cooperation, the tax system is unsustainable. The law alone will not hold it together.

Tax policy should reflect the people’s priorities

Secondly, tax policy is an instrument of economic and social policy. It should reflect the priorities of the democratically elected government, the priorities to which citizens have given their support through the electoral process. Policy should not be static because people’s priorities, and the needs of the economy, inevitably change over time. The responsibility of policy-makers is to shape or reshape the tax system to help ensure the delivery of those priorities, not to obstruct it.

Policy-making necessarily includes designing measures that will raise revenue, because all governments need revenue to fulfil their expenditure commitments, but it requires much more than that. It requires the careful design of targeted tax measures that will facilitate the achievement of particular objectives and policy outcomes that benefit from democratic support. This is not a call for tax favouritism – and certainly not a call for what is alleged to have been the Montoro approach – but a recognition of the need for intelligent tax design that reflects what citizens want, and a medium-term strategy through which to deliver it. Tax policy can play a significant role in delivering beneficial outcomes that reflect both economic need and democratic consensus. The electoral process provides an ideal opportunity for political parties to set out, and be judged by reference to, the policy principles to which they are committed.

The legitimacy and effectiveness of tax administration requires mutual trust

Thirdly, the administration of the tax system requires consent and trust. Trust and taxation are bedfellows of necessity. In the absence of trust, the administration of the tax system will be contested and adversarial, consuming unnecessary resources and energy. Good tax systems are built on mutual trust and mutual respect. Many academic studies have shown that taxpayers are more inclined to comply voluntarily when they have trust and confidence in government.[5] But unless government, including the tax agency, trusts taxpayers as well, the system will anyway revert to conflict.[6] An approach to compliance built on enforcement alone is not the answer and is not sustainable in the long term. Accountability, accessibility and fairness are core values that the tax agency’s leadership and staff must fully embrace. They are not optional extras.

Recent reform experiences in other jurisdictions, such as Nigeria, show that ambitious targets for revenue growth cannot be achieved simply through draconian means of enforcement. Quite the opposite. “Let everyone breathe, especially the poor”[7] is an important part of the political philosophy of the Nigerian government, which underpins their reform programme. There are important lessons in this for Spain.

Getting the balance of policy right between revenue raising, fairness and economic development is not easy. It requires a good sense of what is economically desirable, politically feasible, and what can be packaged and sold. In the short term, almost anything can be enforced but, in the end, the pendulum will swing. Letting everyone breathe – and encouraging them to breathe – remains a sound guiding principle.

The benefits and dangers of information technology

There is a significant risk that, in the general push to raise revenue, the international trend moves in the opposite direction, and that, turbo-charged by unconstrained access to information, tax systems become oppressive.Today’s information technology is powerful, and tomorrow’s will be even more so. There is, and should be, no going back.

The rapid advances now visible can potentially help people to breathe. But if misused, information technology can just as easily become an instrument of oppression.  

Across jurisdictions, the benefits of technology in the tax environment are widely discussed. In Uganda, taxpayers express relief at being able to file electronic returns and make digital payments, rather than standing in line for hours in the east African sun to pay a tax bill. In other countries, people talk about the benefits of removing the human interface between taxpayers and the tax authority, reducing the opportunities for corrupt practices among inspectors. Many governments emphasise that technology can transform investigative processes, allowing tax agencies to identify more easily those who would otherwise evade their responsibilities and put the burden onto others.[8]

Information technology has considerable potential for good. But concerns increasingly arise about governance.[9] Have the powers of tax administrations developed in ways that are becoming oppressive of citizen rights, facilitated by technology, including Artificial Intelligence? Should they be reined in? And how, as citizens, can that be achieved if that is the conclusion? Are there special problems in Spain that provide a foretaste of what tax systems might look like elsewhere in the near future?

Should tax agencies’ access to personal lives be limited? Some might argue that such access does no harm if taxpayers act honestly. Others maintain that it matters irrespective of honesty because everyone has a fundamental right to privacy. Most would agree that it matters when the tax agency abuses its authority and powers.

The question arises as to whether societies are sliding inexorably into becoming highly controlled and closely observed environments created by all-seeing and all-knowing tax agencies. Are parliaments complicit in this slide? Do elected representatives endorse this as “progress”? Are they perhaps unwitting drivers of this process?

It is common to assume the benign intent of governments, but recent years have demonstrated that change can come quickly and, for many, unexpectedly. Yesterday’s unthinkable becomes today’s reality.

If there is a failure in the political system to address these issues, the responsibility lies with citizens themselves. If all political choices create the same or similar outcomes, and those are not the right outcomes, it suggests that citizens have failed to express themselves clearly enough. That is a matter for concern. Democratic responsibility requires active participation; reliance on others to “save” the system is not a sustainable substitute.

Citizens or serfs: taxpayer rights in law and practice in 21 countries

The analysis of twenty-one countries that is presented in this lecture, examines how tax systems operate in law and practice and the broader relationship between taxation and the rights of citizens.

Taxpayer rights in Spanish law

Spain has its own legislation on taxpayer rights, today set out in Article 34 of the General Tax Law – Law 58/2003.[10] The list of rights is comparatively short and limited. It stands in sharp contrast with the extensive lists of rights and powers of the tax agency, the obligations imposed on taxpayers, and the requirements from third parties who might receive ‘requests’ from the tax agency during tax investigations.

A very experienced Spanish lawyer summarized the issue as follows:

“The imbalance between rights and obligations is a striking feature. While rights are stated in general terms—to be informed, to be treated with respect, to know the identity of the officials—obligations are detailed exhaustively: to submit documentation, to make accounting books available, to ratify data or to provide records. The contrast is clear: rights are formulated in abstract terms and depend on administrative goodwill, while obligations become specific, immediate and punishable mandates.”

The need for rights to be operationalised

It is not enough for citizens to have rights unless those rights are fully operationalised. The law may be clear but if practice is different, the mere existence of rights may be of little value. It is not practical for every citizen to have to enforce their rights through the courts and most citizens cannot afford it. This puts them at a disadvantage in dealing with an organisation that is powerful and well-resourced, especially one that may be somewhat cavalier in respecting taxpayer rights. In circumstances where the law is less clear-cut – and there are many in Spain – the disadvantage is even greater.

There is both an access-to-justice gap – because the appeal process is too costly for most people – and a structural imbalance – because the power of the tax agency is too strong.[11]

The need for the framework of rights to be comprehensive

A second, general observation, is that it is not enough for citizens to have rights in one aspect of the tax system but not another. In many countries, citizens are able to participate in some way in the policy-making process, through formal or informal consultation. They are asked for comments on a specific set of issues, given enough time to respond, and provided with published feedback on their submissions.

In Spain, there are also consultative processes, but they are often far from satisfactory, very limited in time, and feedback on comments is absent or difficult to find. In principle, real participation through consultation can be very valuable as it helps to ensure that policy has some ex-ante input from the wise and from those most likely to be affected by it. However, if the legislation that emerges from this participatory process still leaves some gaps or lacks clarity, citizens may ultimately need to go to court to resolve an issue. If that is the case, it will be of little benefit to them that they are citizens in the policy-making process unless they are also citizens in the courts. If they are serfs in the courts, things are unlikely to turn out well for them.

All citizens need to be citizens in all aspects of the tax system, with appropriate rights:

• The right to debate how the tax system should be governed, without the authorities trying to stifle discussion
• The right and opportunity to participate in the tax policy-making process
• The right to full representation in the law-making process through democratic institutions
• The right to tax legislation that is clearly written and provides certainty for taxpayers who are required to self-assess
• The right to fair treatment at the hands of the tax agency and a dialogue between equals
• The right to fair and timely access to independent courts
• The right to equal treatment in the courts, without the inherent bias of a presumption of veracity on the side of the tax agency
• The right to be treated as innocent unless proved guilty
• The right to appeal an assessment without paying all the tax immediately
• The right of access to an effective, independent and empowered Ombudsman
• The right of access to advice and support through lawyers who have not been intimidated by the tax agency; and
• The right to privacy.

In principle, many of these rights already exist in Spain, some of them theoretically guaranteed by the Constitution or in EU law. But in practice, many of them are regularly set aside or ignored in the day-to-day activity of the tax agency.

These rights matter because, without them, the relationship undoubtedly tips from citizenship to serfdom. Who is the master? And why? Across the group of twenty-one countries examined, it is relevant to ask, Is Spain different? And, if the answer is “yes”, a further question follows: Is Spain worse than the other twenty?

Spain in the international context: indicators of tax-citizenship

There is a broadly accepted range of indicators for citizenship in tax matters. These were set out in the first Amsterdam Briefing, published a few months ago in a number of Spanish national newspapers.[12] These indicators, together with specific measures of taxpayer rights and freedoms, provide a framework within which to assess the extent to which Spain recognises and adequately protects taxpayer rights and whether it differs in this respect from other countries.

The framing of the relationship

Consideration must be given to the overall framing of the relationship between the tax agency and the citizen.

In Spain, there is no doubt that the citizen is the “obligado tributario”, defined by reference to the debt owed to the tax agency and to the commonwealth. Terminology matters because it has the ability to legitimise or constrain practices. It shapes the substance. It can be the visible tip of the behavioural iceberg.

In the UK, the term is “customer” of His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs.[13] This framing reflects a “service” approach that normally characterises HMRC: a public service organisation. Taxpayers may not be able to take their custom elsewhere, unless they leave the country altogether, but while they remain, HMRC is at their service. Throughout its website, they are referred to as “customers”.

A similar approach is found in Australia: “Our relationship with you is based on mutual trust and respect. We are committed to being fair, ethical and accountable in everything we do.” “We will be responsive and provide timely, accurate and easy-to-understand information.”[14] It is the language of service, not the imposition of serfdom.

It is much the same in Canada and the US, where citizen rights are even stronger.[15] In Uganda, citizens are “esteemed clients” of the Uganda Revenue Authority, whose voluntary compliance is encouraged by service quality.[16]

These are not some quaint characteristics of Anglo-Saxon countries. In the Netherlands, the tax agency presents classic citizen-service framing.[17] The German-speaking word commonly uses the notion of the “Steuerbürger” (“tax-citizens”) – recognising the duality of the relationship, taxation and citizenship: the core of the fiscal-social contract.[18] The Austrian finance ministry also describes itself as a service-oriented administration.[19]

As expected, Sweden and Finland also stress the service aspect of the tax agency’s work and its engagement with and support for citizens and others.[20]

In fairness to Spain, its language is not all about taxpayers’ obligations, but both the website and the legislation are oppressively heavy with the rights and powers of the tax agency.

The absence of a Taxpayer Charter or Bill of Rights

There is no Taxpayer Charter in Spain, that might give citizens more certainty and potentially enforceable rights.[21] The tax agency has an Ethical Code, but its focus is mainly internal, and it gives only a passing nod to the responsibilities of agency staff towards citizens. It is in no way comparable with the Taxpayers’ Bill of Rights in the USA or Canada, which contain enforceable rights that give real meaning to the concept of citizenship in the system of taxation.[22]

In the UK, the HMRC Charter defines the service and standards of behaviour that customers should expect from its people.[23]  Although not legally enforceable in the same way as the US and Canadian models, it establishes real expectations of conduct and is treated accordingly by all parties. The Australian approach is very similar: real but not enforceable.[24]

The Uganda Revenue Authority also has a Client Service Charter which sets out the expectations that citizens should have of it.[25] Service-oriented approaches are not confined to high-income countries.

Other countries have similar statements of taxpayer rights. Italy has its own enforceable Bill of Rights, substantially updated and strengthened in 2024, setting out foundational legal rules rather than aspirations.[26] France has not gone as far as Italy – its Charter lacks enforceability – but nevertheless establishes mutual expectations and obligations between citizens and the tax agency.[27]

It is clear that the Spanish tax agency sees things differently from many of its international peers, relying primarily on the Ley General Tributaria and a weak ethical code rather than a dedicated, citizen-facing Bill of rights.

Communication with taxpayers

The difference extends to to the model for communication with taxpayers. Correspondence in Spain tends to be formalistic, prolix, and often lacking in clarity of purpose. An experienced Spanish lawyer describes it as follows:

“The first problematic aspect is the intensive use of legalistic language, riddled with references to articles of the General Tax Law and the General Regulation (the RGAT), without any educational explanation to the taxpayer about the real scope of these regulations. This excess of technical references does not provide clarity, but rather serves to intimidate: it cloaks the Administration in unquestionable authority and places the taxpayer in a position of inferiority.”

By contrast, HMRC’s written communications to taxpayers tend to be short and very much to the point.[28] In Spain, documents setting out 100 pages of “facts” and figures are common, with a key sentence or two buried away in the middle of it. Typically, the Inspector could condense the salient points into one or two pages. The simple statement “I do not believe you”, does not require a lengthy exposition, yet the documentation often amounts to little more than that, especially in those instances in which the Inspector asserts “simulación”.

Meetings with taxpayers

The contrasting styles extend to taxpayer meetings. HMRC is open to face-to-face meetings at the request of taxpayers or their advisers. Meetings are generally professional and collegial – encounters between equals seeking resolution. They are generally minuted in full, with a record of what was said that is available to the taxpayer.

In Spain, meetings tend to occur at the command of the Inspector and documentation of them differs markedly. The “diligencia” that follows shortly afterwards typically consists of a list of prior meetings, correspondence, and new information requests. It makes no pretence of recording the discussion that took place. Statements made by the Inspector, including those of considerable significance, are often not minuted, potentially leaving the taxpayer at a disadvantage as a result. The option to have a minute-taker present, as the taxpayer’s representative, exists in principle, but lawyers report hesitation to do so, fearing that they or their client may be treated even less favourably as a result. Consequently, the only documentation of the meeting is the formal “diligencia”.

Access to the administrative file

Access to the administrative file is another issue. Law and practice seem uncertain in Spain. In practice, it seems impossible to achieve access to the administrative file and see what “evidence” has been collected by the tax agency or to challenge it, until the very last moment in an audit process, when the citizen has only a few days to understand and potentially counter what is being alleged.

It is unlikely that an audit in the UK would reach that point without HMRC’s concerns being set out, especially if the taxpayer requests clarification. Yet it is unlikely that HMRC would simply “open the file” in the same way as occurs in Spain.

The use and misuse of data

Data issues in Spain are extensive. They include not only the fundamental type of data security issues reported in the media, but also broader issues of information powers, breaches of the Constitution and GDPR, use of technology and AI, and weak governance framework that controls and regulates – or should control and regulate – their use.

The tax agency in Spain possesses very broad information-gathering powers, detailed in legislation and Royal Decrees.[29] By contrast, governance arrangements are sparsely documented. Key questions remain: “What does the Agency collect data for? How are they used? What limits exist on the agency’s right to know? Who decides? What safeguards govern audit selection, algorithms and processes?”

While Article 18 of the Spanish Constitution and the GDPR seem designed to protect the privacy of the individual and the family, the tax agency seems to be in frequent breach of both. Detailed personal data – including information about taxpayer’s children, credit card transactions and other payments – are routinely collected and recorded in the administrative file without relevance to the investigation.[30] Statements from colleagues, acquaintances or service providers are gathered without advance notice and, although often hearsay, are recorded as if they were evidence. International fishing expeditions are launched to harvest data to which the tax agency has no obvious right and for which it has no real need. The presumption of regularity that facilitates such requests is stretched thin. “Of course, the tax agency needs and will not misuse such data”.

Files examined show that the Spanish tax agency can be cavalier not only with the target taxpayer’s data, but also with that of third parties, often including unredacted information revealing the economic and social activities of unrelated third parties.

The Spanish tax agency’s public statements about data and AI remain vague.[31] Other tax agencies– for instance those of the US and Germany, Sweden and Australia – publish detailed frameworks specifying safeguards, purposes, and accountability mechanisms.[32] The Spanish tax agency’s Ethical Commitment in the design and use of AI, dated 30 January 2025, lacks such specificity, offering only general statements.[33] This vagueness erodes publictrust and signals weak internal controls.[34]

The presumption of innocence and the burden of proof

The presumption of innocence, explicit in Article 24(2) of the Spanish Constitution of 1978 and the closely related issue of equality before the law in Article 14, are imperilled, inter alia, by Articles 105-108 of the General Tax Law. These Articles govern evidence and the burden of proof. Many taxpayers experience the burden of proof being reversed against them during audits and enforcement processes, with heavy reliance placed on third party-statements that gain apparent veracity merely through inclusion in the administrative file or notes of proceedings.[35]

Spanish taxpayers are not entirely alone in facing such challenges. The broad equivalent of the principle in Article 105 of Spain’s General Tax Law that “whoever asserts his right must prove the facts” – exists elsewhere, but implementation differs. In Austria, the burden of proof lies with the tax authority proposing adjustments to a tax return.[36] The situation is similar in Belgium, Italy, Switzerland and Greece except where documentation is missing or inadequate. In Sweden and Finland, the burden of proof seems to be shared. In Sweden, the rationale is that the party who can most easily prove a fact has the responsibility for providing that proof. [37]

In Spain, however, the burden appears to shift easily to the taxpayer. This is not just the case where simulación is alleged. For example, when determining residence, the tax agency may have information that a particular individual was in Spain on two separate dates. The individual must then prove absence on all intervening days, even though the tax agency has no evidence to the contrary. Proving a negative is inherently difficult, and Inspectors are aware of this.[38]

The persistence of such practices is linked to remuneration arrangements for tax agency staff – the bonus system – which by incentivising higher assessments also incentivises behaviour that differs from the norm elsewhere.

Spain in the international context: incentive bonuses for AEAT staff

The 2025 agreement between leadership and unions reveals bonuses worth €125 million, linked to targets for additional collections of income tax and VAT.[39]  Tax agency leadership aims for growth in collections exceeding natural economic growth. Shared equally among the agency’s 25,000 staff, the bonus pool would amount to €5,000 per employee.

The agency asserts, without evidence, that the amount linked to collections represents only 1.4% of pay. On that basis, as the full €125 million is linked to bonuses, mathematically, tax agency staff would seem to be paid on average more than €350,000 per year – an implausible figure. The 1.4% has been quoted repeatedly since 2022 without supporting analysis, and the schemes are said to be a state secret.[40] Separate agreements are reached annually, with varying amounts and targets. These circumstances make the persistent 1.4% claim untenable. The tax agency expects others to accept lower standards of evidence from itself than it expects of taxpayers.

Spain’s model of incentive bonuses creates a personal financial incentive for inspectors and managers alike. It is more than just an outlier. Among advanced tax administrations it is unique. International practice shows that while conventional performance-related pay exists – very small in scale and linked to multi-metric frameworks, such as efficiency, service quality, and organisational outcomes – almost all peer systems deliberately avoid tying individual remuneration to the monetary results of audits.

The OECD does not recommend collection-linked individual evaluation, precisely because of the risks to impartiality and due process.[41] The United States goes further with a bright-line legal prohibition: the IRS may not use “records of tax enforcement results (ROTERs)” in employee evaluations that drive reward.[42]

Some countries do, nevertheless, operate a modest, pooled performance-bonus model that has a linkage to collections. For instance, in Italy, incentive and bonus schemes are accepted practice, and some revenue agency bonus plans are reported (though not transparently documented) to incorporate performance factors including tax outcomes.[43] In Mexico, there is an indirect link between staff reward and collection outcomes, but bonuses are very small.[44]

Canada operated a system of reward for tax agency staff linked to collections targets, but the system was heavily criticised because the evidence showed that it distorted staff behaviour and assessments, especially towards the end of the bonus award period.[45] It does not now permit individual bonuses to be based on amounts assessed or collected. A significant feature of the Canadian system is the distinction made between rewards for staff, which are governed by broadly-based collective agreements, and executive performance pay, which is tied to leadership and service objectives, not tax revenue raised.[46] This prevents management and staff from having the same personal interest in over-assessment and is one of the important checks and balances that is missing from the Spanish system.

Apart from these few examples, in every other country studied, there are no bonus systems linked to collections in the Spanish way.

Giving auditors, as the Spanish system does, a personal financial incentive of any magnitude whatsoever that is based on audit outcomes, removes objectivity and independence entirely.[47] The Spanish system creates conflict of interest, peer pressure and management pressure on individual inspectors, motivating them to find errors in investigations regardless of substance.[48] The pressure to assess and collect is real, as blogs published by tax agency staff confirm.

The bonuses are particularly problematic as they drive cultural and behavioural norms that undermine legal certainty and make relationships with citizens and businesses very different from what is seen in many other countries, and they reinforce the negative aspects of the formal framing of the relationship.

The proof of the incentive effect of the bonuses on auditors is not just in the surge of tax revenues but also in the extraordinarily high loss rate for the tax agency in the appeals process – far higher than that of other tax agencies.[49] Inspectors have been motivated to invent faults in taxpayer returns.[50] For Spain’s taxpayers, achieving certainty and justice remains a long process.

The economic consequences of the tax environment in Spain

As more evidence of the lack of certainty in Spain’s tax system comes into the public domain, there are signs that investment is being affected. The Institute of Economic Studies has published its Tax Competitiveness Index, citing recent, significant underperformance in Foreign Direct Investment into Spain, which it links to the problems with tax certainty.[51] According to The Objective, and substantially confirmed in El Pais, Spain suffered its greatest drop in FDI for 16 years in the first half of 2025: a more than 60% decline against last year’s performance.[52] Of course, there have been other factors at work besides taxation, but the decline has come at the same time as public and international awareness of the issues at Hacienda and the tax agency has increased dramatically. Serious errors and misjudgements in tax policy and tax administration can have dramatic effects on investment. France, by contrast, seems to have experienced a very substantial increase in FDI in the same period, reversing its 2024 performance in spite of the many uncertainties in its political sphere.[53]

Excessive emphasis should not be placed on the FDI issue. The figures are likely to be provisional and the situation may change in the second half of the year. However, there is clearly an issue, as the government will be aware, and concerns about the administration of taxes in Spain may be playing a part in the changing investment patterns that have been reported.[54] In the 2024 World Bank Enterprise Survey, 36.8% of firms in Spain identified tax administration as a major or very severe constraint, compared with 12.7% in Europe and central Asia as a whole, and 16.6% in all economies.[55] In the UK, the comparative was 6.5% and in Sweden, it was just 2.5%.[56]  Businesses based in Spain also reported spending 150 hours per year on tax compliance compared with 50 in the UK and a global average of 84.7.[57]  These numbers speak for themselves and need no further comment from me.

Spain in the international context: other key factors that affect tax citizenship

Returning to the main theme of this lecture, attention now turns to other aspects of the Spanish tax environment that have a bearing on the citizen-serf issues – specifically the pay-to-appeal system, the issue of independence for the lower courts and tribunals, the Ombudsman system and the use of Royal Decrees.

These will be addressed briefly in this lecture, although they are important issues that are each worthy of a paper in their own right.

The pay-to-appeal system in Spain

First, the pay-to-appeal issue. “Pay-to-appeal” is a slight misnomer. A taxpayer in Spain may appeal an assessment even if the tax assessed has not been paid. It is simply that assets are likely to be seized if payment is not made. The tax collection process is not suspended if an appeal is made. It is also true that a taxpayer can, instead of making a cash payment to the authorities, potentially, if rather expensively, obtain a guarantor for the liability or make a pledge of suitable assets to cover it. In some circumstances, suspension of payment is theoretically possible, but it is usually difficult in practice for taxpayers to obtain this relief.

The requirement to make a payment – referred to here in that way – is itself a pre-judgement of the outcome.[58] It pre-supposes that the assessment is correct, that the tax is, in fact, due and that, by appealing, the taxpayer is merely playing for time at the expense of the government. However, the figures suggest otherwise. The Institute of Economic Studies reported that the tax agency has a loss ratio of almost 50% in relation to appeals brought by taxpayers.[59] Financially, the impact on the public finances is significant. In 2023, the Treasury had to set aside well over one billion euros to pay refunds to taxpayers who had been wrongly forced to pay by the system.[60] So, the premise which underpins the pay-to-appeal system – that the tax assessed will be due – is simply wrong.

Several countries nevertheless take a similar approach, in principle if not in practice. In Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Portugal, South Africa, Sweden and Switzerland, the taxpayer’s appeal does not suspend the collection process. However, as with most yes/no answers, scratch the surface and it is quickly evident that the story does not end there. There are substantial variations in how the non-suspension of the tax assessed is put into effect.[61] In Switzerland, for example, the tax assessed cannot be enforced as a debt until the tax liability has been determined and is legally binding. In Finland and Germany, collection of the tax assessed will normally be suspended in practice, unless the appeal is manifestly unfounded. Other countries offer similar arrangements that effectively suspend the collection process but at the taxpayer’s risk in terms of interest on unpaid tax. Some, like France ask for guarantees in a similar way to Spain.

Away from this group, different practices are evident. In Uganda, a taxpayer will be asked to pay any amount assessed that is not disputed but will not be asked to pay more than 30% of any disputed amount and may have the payment suspended entirely.[62] In other countries, including Belgium, Canada, the UK and the US, payment of disputed tax is normally suspended on appeal,[63] reflecting the fact that the existence of a tax debt has not yet been determined and that the issue should not be pre-judged against the taxpayer. Taxpayer rights are stronger in these countries. In the UK, where around 90% of disputes are won in the courts and tribunals by HMRC, the presumption of innocence still holds good.[64]

The situation in Spain is extreme. In the context of Spain’s court system, where justice may take ten years or more to be achieved,[65] the financial burden placed on the taxpayer is very heavy. It would be easy to conclude that the government’s approach is intended to deter appeals and encourage taxpayers to settle rather than test their case. It certainly has that effect.

The system for administrative appeals

The taxpayer disadvantage caused by the pay-to-appeal system is exacerbated by two additional, related problems: firstly the fact that Spain’s lower courts and tribunals, the Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Regional (Regional Economic-Administrative Tribunal) (TEAR) and the Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Central (Central Tax Tribunal)  (TEAC), are not independent of government, as the ECJ has ruled;[66] and secondly the requirement for taxpayers to go through them before being allowed to approach the higher courts.[67] This is a process which will often create significant delays without any clear benefit to taxpayers.

Elsewhere, the system works differently, although in some, the process of obtaining justice can still be very long.

In most of the 21 countries reviewed, administrative appeal procedures are optional rather than compulsory and appeals are heard before independent judges. Where used, they are generally much quicker than in Spain. Only in Sweden and the Netherlands is the process of equivalent length.[68]

In a number of countries, taxpayers can face a similar delay in getting access to justice in the higher courts as they do in Spain. Belgium, Brazil, France, Italy, the UK and the US are in that group. But, with the single exception of Brazil, these countries all provide much shorter, independent, administrative appeal procedures.[69] Other countries also offer alternative dispute resolution processes which are largely lacking in Spain.[70]

The tax Ombudsman

Taxpayers in most of the countries reviewed have the option of taking their complaint to an Ombudsman if they feel aggrieved by the handling of their affairs by the tax agency. Many countries have a tax-specific Ombudsman in place. More than half of the countries have an Ombudsman that is independent from the tax agency.[71] Independence is, of course, an important factor in the delivery of meaningful benefits to taxpayers.

Spain has an Ombudsman, dedicated to taxation issues, but it is far from independent of the tax agency. The legislation leaves no doubt about its standing, proclaiming that “The Council for the Defence of the Taxpayer will have the legal nature of a collegiate body of the State Administration, integrated in this Ministry and attached to the State Secretariat of Finance”.[72] In principle, its Board is balanced between captive and non-captive members but in practice, there is a majority made up of appointees from Hacienda and the tax agency. The regional offices of the Ombudsman are largely led and staffed by officials from the tax agency. The Ombudsman’s budget is very low. It has no powers of enforcement and limited capacity to act on its own.[73] A Board member has stated that 97% of complaints are simply referred to the tax agency for a response. Only 3% are taken on by the Ombudsman.[74]

The annual total of 10-12,000 complaints made to the Ombudsman contrasts sharply with the 239,000 claims reportedly filed with the Economic-Administrative courts in 2023, perhaps a reflection of a lack of taxpayer awareness, or a judgement on its effectiveness.[75] Regrettably, although it has had some recent successes, the tax Ombudsman in Spain is simply another example of taxpayer disadvantage in Spain and of its outlier status among tax systems.

The use of Royal Decrees (Reales Decretos)

One final issue is the use of Royal Decrees in Spain.

The point is a simple one: in a democracy, the elected representatives of the people should make tax law, however imperfectly they might do that. They should particularly safeguard and enforce their right to set limits on the powers of state institutions, like the tax agency, vis à vis citizens. In Spain, they appear to have been unable or unwilling to do that and have failed to protect the individual against the growth in powers of the tax agency.

The principle of tax legality in Spain is enshrined in Articles 31(3) and 133 of the Constitution, which require that the creation, modification, and abolition of taxes, as well as the determination of their essential elements, be carried out only by law. This principle constitutes a fundamental guarantee for citizens and a limitation on the powers of the public authorities, intended to ensure legal certainty and the protection of taxpayers’ rights.

The use of Royal Decrees has the potential to endanger the protection envisaged in the Constitution and to concede substantial power to the Executive, undermining parliamentary sovereignty and democratic oversight and ultimately eroding the guarantees and individual rights that should be central to the tax system.[76]

It is true that the reservation of law in tax matters is relative in nature, allowing certain secondary or management aspects to be developed through regulations, provided that the essential elements defined by law are not altered. The issue is whether the use of Royal Decrees is constrained tightly enough by the democratic framework and whether it now goes beyond what is acceptable.

Royal Decrees have been used to elaborate significant powers that have become entrenched in the hands of the tax agency. The authority on which they are issued is set out in laws which parliament has passed but the specification of what can and cannot be dealt with in these regulations is often somewhat limited.

This is an area where shades of grey abound, and the resolution of the issue can be difficult. Almost all democratic countries face similar issues, and they have chosen different paths to resolve them.

Across mature systems, it is often the case that statutes set the essential elements of taxation – who is taxed, on what base, at what rate, when the liability arises, and what reliefs are available ­– while regulations handle much of the detail of implementation. It is not obvious why this should be the case – except in terms of freeing parliamentary time – and the flip side is a reduction of democratic scrutiny. But many countries nevertheless adopt this practice. Where they tend to differ is in the amount of licence given to the Executive to introduce powers through regulation. Some require a higher level of specificity to be embodied in the parent legislation than others.

This is a complex area, and it is impossible to do justice to it in just a few words. To give a sense of the different shades of grey in the countries studied: in France the essentials are assigned to Parliament and decrees are subject to strong constitutional and administrative review.[77]Germany allows executive ordinances only where the enabling law clearly specifies content, purpose, and scope, with additional federal checks.[78]Belgium requires taxes to be imposed and implemented by law and the Council of State can annul Royal Decrees that exceed statutory authority.[79]The Netherlands mandates that taxes rest on an Act of Parliament and uses the AWR – the General Tax Act – to anchor delegated procedures.[80] Italy applies a relative riserva di legge and a taxpayer statute that constrains administrative discretion.[81] The UK enacts tax changes through Finance Acts but uses Statutory Instruments that are issued under defined parliamentary procedures and a published consultation framework.[82] The US vests taxing power in Congress and requires the notice-and-comment rules of the APA – the Administrative Procedure Act – which provide transparency and accountability for Treasury and IRS regulations – to be applied. After the 2024 Loper Bright decision, agency interpretations are subject to even closer judicial scrutiny.[83]

The concern in Spain is that the government has chosen arguably the least democratic instrument at its disposal to impose some of the strongest powers that the tax agency holds, without the apparent safeguards that have been put in place in other countries. The Spanish government could tighten practice by adopting an explicit content, purpose and scope test for delegation, mandating structured consultations with published responses, strengthening ex-ante and ex-post review of secondary rules, and implementing a taxpayer statute to constrain administrative discretion. Accountability to parliament could also be strengthened.

Concluding thoughts

Where does this analysis of citizenship and serfdom in Spain and its peers lead? The research and analysis undertaken show that, in most areas of taxpayer rights in law and practice, the Spanish tax agency is at the very far edge of what might be considered “normal” among the 21 tax agencies studied and, in two critical areas, Spain is clearly an outlier:

• The framing of the relationship between citizens and the tax agency; and
• The payment of incentive bonuses conditional on additional collections.

These two factors influence and substantially account for, the negative developments that have taken place in the behaviour of the agency’s leadership and staff in recent years and have created a hostile environment for taxpayers in Spain.

Further research is needed to understand, at a more granular level, exactly how the actions of the tax agency are affecting taxpayer morale and economic activity, but innovation and entrepreneurial activity both seem to be held back, and investment into Spain may be suffering as well. There is also a strong flow of anecdotal evidence that suggests a deep and growing sense of injustice among Spanish citizens who have been touched by the tax agency in one way or another. These are warning signs that government should not ignore.

Of course, Spain is not the only country where citizens feel under pressure from tax agencies. Parliaments and governments need to reflect on how far they should be allowed to intrude into our lives, how much information they should be entitled to gather and hold, and how effective current protections are for citizens against the power that they wield. Rights to privacy and broader freedoms should be proof against the actions of governments that are less benign than those of today.

Unfortunately, the existing constitutional and legislative protections do not seem to be effective but advances in technology should not be allowed to threaten freedoms. Good governance is an essential safeguard. Economies and societies could also benefit from some Nigerian influence: “Let everyone breathe, especially the poor.”

For Spain, some action is clearly needed to rein in the power of the tax agency. This will not be easy. The objective of Robert Amsterdam’s work, through analysis and debate, is not only to validate the diagnosis of the problem, but also to engage in finding workable solutions and sustaining momentum for reform that will help to ensure that citizens are not serfs in their own tax systems. That is the objective: to achieve necessary and meaningful change.

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[1] Robert Amsterdam and Christopher Wales (2025). Hacienda vs. The People. An initial report on Spain and the Beckham Law. White Paper. See also: Robert Amsterdam (2024). ‘Beckham Law’: Spain’s bait-and-switch tax trap needs exposing. SPEAR’s, 11 December.

[2] Instituto de Estudios Económicos (2024). El problema de la litigiosidad tributaria en España. Propuestas de solución y mejora desde la perspectiva de las empresas.Revista del IEE, No. 1 2/2025.

[3] Article 2 of the Royal Decree 1676/2009, of November 13, regulating the Taxpayer Defense Council. See also: Official Website of the Ministerio de Hacienda, Consejo para la Defensa del Contribuyente.

[4] European Parliament. Perverse incentives from the Spanish Tax Agency’s bonus schemes. Parliamentary question E-002010/2025 (2025).

[5] Larissa M. Batrancea et al. (2022), “A self-employed taxpayer experimental study on trust, power and tax compliance in eleven countries,” Financial Innovation 9, No. 96.

[6] E. Hofmann et al. (2014), “Enhancing Tax Compliance through Coercive and Legitimate Power of Tax Authorities by Concurrently Diminishing or Facilitating Trust in Tax Authorities,” Law Policy, 36(3), pp. 290-313.

[7] Bola Tinubu has been quoted as saying, ‘Let the poor breathe’ during his inauguration, reflecting a rhetorical commitment to tax relief for vulnerable citizens. Since taking office, his administration has pursued a tax overhaul with provisions aimed at providing relief for low-income earners and small businesses, while also expanding the tax base to include wealthier individuals and larger corporations.

[8] OECD (2025). Tax Administration Digitalisation and Digital Transformation Initiatives. OECD Publishing, Paris. This inventory reports that 72 % of tax administrations now use AI, most commonly for fraud detection and risk assessment; 87 % of those using AI have imposed limitations on that use.

[9] OECD (2025), Governing with Artificial Intelligence: The State of Play and Way Forward in Core Government Functions, OECD Publishing, Paris. The report analyzes over 200 government use cases, including AI in tax administration, and stresses that adoption must be governed to protect privacy, explainability, and trust.

[10] Article 34 of the Spanish Ley 58/2003, de 17 de diciembre, General Tributaria enumerates the “derechos y garantías de los obligados tributarios,” including rights to be informed and assisted, to know the identity of officials handling one’s case, to present documents, to receive copies, to not re-submit documents already in the administration’s possession, and to lodging complaints and suggestions, among others. The BOE text of Law 58/2003 explicitly repeals and incorporates earlier rights and guarantees from Ley 1/1998 de Derechos y Garantías de los Contribuyentes. The official “Catálogo de Derechos del Contribuyente” published by the Spanish Ministry of Finance likewise refers to Article 34 as the legal basis for taxpayer rights in the Spanish system.

[11] This has been observed in comparative studies of EU taxpayer-rights protection, which stress that while formal recognition of defence rights is increasingly harmonised, their practical enforceability depends on access to effective remedies and proportionality in administrative procedures. See Mirugia Richardson (2024). Taxpayers’ Right to Defence in the EU Law and European Convention on Human Rights Regimes. IBFD Doctoral Series No. 71. See also OECD (2021). Tax Administration 2021: Comparative Information on OECD and other Advanced and Emerging Economies. OECD Publishing, Paris, which highlights that procedural accessibility and affordability remain key determinants of real taxpayer protection.

[12] See, for instance: La Razon. El bufete Amsterdam & Partners llevará a España ante la ONU y la OCDE para denunciar sus violaciones fiscales. 26 June 2025.

[13] Official Website of the UK Government. IDG30100 – Confidentiality when dealing with the customer: definition of ‘customer’.

[14] Australian Taxation Office: Our Charter.

[15] Canada: Taxpayer Bill of Rights; US: Taxpayer Bill of Rights.

[16] Uganda Revenue Authority (URA). Client Service Charter (Fiscal Year 2021/2022).

[17] The Belastingdienst routinely frames itself as a service provider to citizens and businesses, emphasising accessibility, user-oriented tools (e.g. online portals, guidance, chat support), and clear procedures, rather than purely coercive enforcement.”

[18] Bundesministerium der Finanzen – Bürger und Steuern.

[19] Official Website of the Bundesministerium Finanzen: commitment to a “serviceorientierten Verwaltung” (service-oriented administration).

[20] Swedish Tax Agency (Skatteverket) — English service pages for individuals (indicative of citizen-service approach); Finnish public service portal entry for the Tax Administration: “collects taxes to safeguard the functioning of Finnish society…” (agency mission and service role)..

[21] According to a survey by the Project on Taxpayers’ Rights and Charters (2019), Spain’s response explicitly states: “No, there isn’t currently a tax Charter.”  In contrast, Spain formally acknowledges having a “charter or bill of rights” in the IBFD Observatory on the Protection of Taxpayers’ Rights questionnaire (2025), but its substance and enforceability are very limited in practice.

See Observatory on the Protection of Taxpayers’ Rights

[22] For example, the Canada Revenue Agency publishes its Taxpayer Bill of Rights, detailing 16 rights that taxpayers can expect when dealing with the agency.

[23] HM Revenue and Customs. The HMRC Charter.

[24] Australian Taxation Office (ATO) Charter which commits the agency to fairness, accountability, and accessibility: “Our relationship with you is based on mutual trust and respect. We are committed to being fair, ethical and accountable in everything we do.”

[25] URA. Client Service Charter (Fiscal Year 2021/2022) sets out the expectations citizens should have of it and commits to “delivering efficient, effective and high-quality service.” Service-oriented approaches, therefore, are not confined to high-income countries.

[26] Italy: Statuto dei Diritti del Contribuente.

[27] France: Charte des droits et obligations du contribuable vérifié.

[28] According to HMRC’s Charter and its HMRC’s style guide, all correspondence must be written “clearly, concisely, and in a tone that helps customers understand what they need to do.

[29] See Ley General Tributaria (LGT) on information-duties and collaboration (notably arts. 93–95), and the implementing Real Decreto 1065/2007 (RGAT) on management/inspection procedures. See also recent amendments in Law 13/2023 expanding the Tax Administration’s powers in verification procedures, including examining commercial accounting records in taxpayer premises.

[30] The breadth of these powers is clear in the primary instruments (e.g., arts. 93–95 LGT), though relevance filtering and proportionality are not extensively specified in public-facing governance documents.

[31] Its “Questions about Artificial Intelligence in the Tax Agency” page commits to a “human-in-the-loop” principle and some controls, but lacks detail on concrete safeguards for audit or control processes. In particular, it states that automated administrative actions will not be based exclusively on AI outputs, and that human supervision is always guaranteed. However, the document does not disclose how selection algorithms or model biases will be audited or constrained.

[32] See for instance: United States (IRS): public AI Governance Interim Policy and AI Privacy Policy, plus IRM privacy chapters require Privacy/Civil Liberties Impact Assessments for AI; Australia (ATO): public AI transparency statement and “How we use data and analytics” (data ethics principles, human oversight, explanations).

[33] See “Compromiso ético en el diseño y uso de IA en la AEAT” (PDF) and AEAT’s AI page; both emphasize principles (legality, transparency, human-in-the-loop, equity) but provide limited public detail on concrete governance mechanics (e.g., selection-algorithm documentation, ex-ante bias testing, appeal triggers).

[34] For a policy/academic overview of AI risks in tax administration (opacity, discrimination, due-process concerns), see Centro Interamericano de Administraciones Tributarias (CIAT)’s analysis of “gracias y desgracias” of AI in tax administrations and related scholarly commentary.

[35] Academic commentary observes that, in practice, “the burden of proof is often displaced onto the taxpayer in situations of alleged abuse or simulation, strengthening the position of the administration.” María Rodríguez-Bereijo León (2011). La carga de la prueba en el derecho tributario: su aplicación en las normas tributarias anti-abuso y en la doctrina del TJUE. Revista de Contabilidad y Tributación, (344), 5–50.

[36] Gerard Meussen et al. General report EATLP Conference 2-4 June 2011 Uppsala, Sweden, ‘Burden of proof’.

[37] Gerard Meussen et al. General report EATLP Conference 2-4 June 2011 Uppsala, Sweden, ‘Burden of proof’.

[38] Spanish case law, such as the Supreme Court’s decision on EU-dividend exemptions, has reaffirmed that the burden of proof for abuse must rest with the tax authority, though practice still varies. BDO. Spain –  Burden of proof is on tax authorities to show abuse when denying exemption on EU dividends.

[39] “Información sobre complemento de productividad” — AEAT’s official site page listing the Resolución productividad and Instrucción 2025 documents related to productivity bonuses. See also media article on the bonus offer: Mercedes Serraller-Economía (2025). Hacienda pacta un bonus de 125 millones con su plantilla a cambio de recaudar más IRPF e IVA. Vozpopuli.

[40] According to a news article from AEDAF (the Spanish tax advisers’ association) (2022) summarizing a court-ordered disclosure, the Agencia Tributaria itself “estima que la cuantía liquidada por el actuario apenas supone 1,4 de cada 100 euros de su retribución total” (PDF). A separate AEDAF brief (2022) reiterates that, “según ha reconocido la propia Agencia Tributaria,” the liquidated amount “solo supone el 1,4% de cada 100 euros” (PDF).

[41] OECD (2024). Tax Administration 2024: Comparative Information on OECD and other Advanced and Emerging Economies. OECD Publishing, Paris shows many administrations link performance to pay/reward, but within broader performance-management systems (individual objectives, development plans) and warns such mechanisms can have adverse effects on culture if badly designed—consistent with multi-metric frameworks rather than audit-cash targets.

[42] Internal Revenue Service: 1.5.2 Uses of Section 1204 Statistics.

[43] In the Italian Revenue Agency, a pooled “performance” pot for staff is explicitly distributed largely by reference to monetary objectives achieved: an official AE/MEF document states the sum is divided among regions “for 3/4 based on the monetary objective achieved and for 1/4 …,” i.e., a collective pool with a collections linkage. See also the AE’s 2024 agreement on the Fondo Risorse Decentrate for year 2022 (FRD) tying awards to mission-activity performance (a pooled mechanism, not individual bounty). Legal 500 – Italy: Employee Incentives describes that incentive plans are commonly used in Italy.

[44] While public AEAT-style “cash-collected” bonuses aren’t disclosed, the legal basis for small performance stimuli and SAT’s performance-evaluation system are clear (See Ley Federal de Presupuesto Y Responsabilidad Hacendaria: Nueva Ley publicada en el Diario Oficial de la Federación el 30 de marzo de 2006).

[45] Kenneth J. Klassen and N. Pantaleo (2020). Assessing the Canada Revenue Agency: Evidence on Tax Auditors’ Incentives and Assessments. Institut C.D. HOWE Institute.

[46] Performance Management Program (PMP) for Executives – Treasury Board Secretariat.

[47] The Objective (2022). Los inspectores de Hacienda cobran bonus de 30.000 euros al año aunque sus actas fracasen. News article 9 November; La Razon (2022). Los bonus de los inspectores de Hacienda: a dedo y de hasta 32.000 euros aunque los expedientes no prosperen.

[48] European Parliament documents highlight concerns that these schemes encourage aggressive collection practices and jeopardize principles of fairness and legal certainty. See: European Parliament. Perverse incentives from the Spanish Tax Agency’s bonus schemes. Parliamentary question E-002010/2025 (2025).

[49] Resitax (2025). Tax litigation in Spain: a brake on investment that requires urgent solutions. Post 14 July.

[50] Lorraine Williamson (2022). Financial incentives for tax inspectors to report defaulters. In Spain News.

[51] Institute de Estudios Economicos and Tax Foundation (2025). Competitividad fiscal empresarial 2025: El nuevo indicador de la contribución fiscal empresarial total.

[52] The Objective (2025). La inversión extranjera en España se desploma un 60% en el primer semestre. See also: Empresa Exterior (citing official Spanish data and U.S. State Department analysis):
“During the first six months of 2025, foreign direct investment (FDI) plummeted 60.4% compared to the same period in 2024, totaling just €8.476 billion, the lowest figure in ten years.” U.S. State Department Investment Climate Statement also confirms the sharp decline and attributes it partly to regulatory uncertainty.

[53] John E. Kaye (2025). France’s FDI renaissance marks a Nouvelle Ère for Europe. The European. 

[54] IESE Insight (2025). Spain remains attractive for foreign firms, despite taxation and bureaucracy challenges.

[55] World Bank. Enterprise Survey: Spain (2024).

[56] World Bank. Enterprise Survey: Spain (2024), United Kingdom (2024) and Sweden (2024).

[57] World Bank. Enterprise Survey: Spain (2024).

[58] Post on the Citizens Advice Bureau (2024). Unfair Practices in Spain’s Tax System: Addressing the Barriers to Fair Appeals for Expats.

[59] Institute of Economic Studies (2025). El problema de la litigiosidad tributaria en España. Propuestas de solución y mejora desde la perspectiva de las empresas.

[60] IEE data show that adverse judgments and refunds cost the Spanish Treasury over €12 billion, including indemnities and interest, highlighting the fiscal impact of erroneous assessments. Institute of Economic Studies (2025). El problema de la litigiosidad tributaria en España. Propuestas de solución y mejora desde la perspectiva de las empresas.

[61] OECD (2024). Tax Administration 2024: Comparative Information on OECD and other Advanced and Emerging Economies. OECD Publishing, Paris.

[62] Uganda’s Tax Appeals Tribunal Act, Art. 15(1).

[63] In Belgium, FOD Financiën classifies debts under judicial challenge (door een vordering in rechte) as “voorlopig niet eisbaar (‘geschillen’)”—temporarily not enforceable—during litigation. Judicial cantonnement (deposit with Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations) also suspends enforcement and lifts seizures until a final ruling. in Canada, Filing a Notice of Objection or an appeal to the Tax Court of Canada generally suspends collection of disputed tax until the matter is resolved, except in rare cases involving jeopardy collection. In the UK, HMRC allows taxpayers to request postponement of payment when appealing direct tax decisions; this is usually granted, and penalties do not need to be paid until appeals are settled. In the US, the IRS Independent Office of Appeals provides an administrative process to resolve disputes without payment; collection actions can be suspended during appeals under Collection Due Process (CDP) rules.

[64] HMRC’s success rate in litigation is high—91.8% in 2023 across all tribunals, according to official data, underscoring that appeals are taken seriously and adjudicated under strict legal standards (2024 HMRC Trends – Success can cost less).

[65] See also: Baker McKenzie: Tax Dispute Resolution Timelines: Spain: Average time to final resolution in Spain exceeds 8–11 years, creating severe delays without clear taxpayer benefit. Resitax (2025). Tax litigation in Spain: a brake on investment that requires urgent solutions. Post 14 July.

[66] The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has confirmed that Spain’s Tribunal Económico-Administrativo Central (TEAC) lacks judicial independence and cannot make preliminary references under Article 267 TFEU, as seen in the Santander case (C-274/14, para. 77).

[67] Spanish law requires taxpayers to exhaust economic-administrative appeals before accessing judicial courts, making this stage compulsory and adding years to the process (see Baker McKenzie: Tax Dispute Resolution Timelines: Spain).

[68] Baker McKenzie: Tax Dispute Resolution Timelines: Netherlands and Sweden.

[69] Baker McKenzie: Tax Dispute Resolution Timelines.

[70] Chambers and Partners: Tax Controversy 2025.

[71] IBFD (2024). Observatory on the Protection of Taxpayers’ Rights.

[72] This is stated explicitly in Article 2 of Royal Decree 1676/2009, of 13 November, which regulates the Taxpayer Protection Council, and confirmed on the official Ministry of Finance website.

[73] F. Serrano (2007). The Taxpayer’s Rights and the Role of the Tax Ombudsman: an Analysis from a Spanish and Comparative Law Perspective. Intertax, vol. 35, Issue 5, pp. 331-340.

[74] Ministerio de Hacienda. Memoria Anual del Consejo para la Defensa del Contribuyente 2024; The Objective (2024). Las quejas ante el Consejo para la Defensa del Contribuyente suben un 16% entre 2022 y 2023.

[75] Ministerio de Hacienda. Memoria 2023 – Consejo para la Defensa del Contribuyente; The Objective (2024). Las quejas ante el Consejo para la Defensa del Contribuyente suben un 16% entre 2022 y 2023; Forbes España. Las reclamaciones económico-administrativas crecen un 32% desde 2019.

[76] In practice, important executive regulations in tax administration have been issued by Royal Decree—e.g., RD 1065/2007 (management and inspection procedures) and Real Decreto 939/2005 (General Collection Regulation)—which develop operational powers for the AEAT (Spanish Tax Agency). See recent press comment: https://www.eleconomista.es/legal/noticias/13613096/10/25/hacienda-obliga-a-los-bancos-a-dar-el-nombre-de-los-titulares-de-tarjetas-que-gasten-mas-de-25000-euros-anuales.html

[77] Constitution of 4 October 1958, Article 34.

[78] Basic Law (Grundgesetz), Art. 80.

[79] Belgian Constitution, Art. 170 and 159.

[80] Algemene wet inzake rijksbelastingen (AWR) – General Tax Act, Art. 1.

[81] Constitution, Article 23 (“No personal or financial obligation may be imposed except by law” (riserva di legge)); Taxpayer Statute (Law 212/2000), Art. 4 (Prohibits introducing taxes via decree-law; must be by parliamentary law); and Law No. 111/2023: Delegation law for tax reform, implemented via legislative decrees.

[82] Statutory Instruments (SIs) governed by Statutory Instruments Act 1946.

[83] Thomson Reuters (2024). Tax Pros Discuss Impact of Loper Bright on IRS Regs.